Being heard above the noise : the role of incumbent issue diversity in election campaigns by Greene, Zachary
Greene, Zachary (2018) Being heard above the noise - the role of 
incumbent issue diversity in election campaigns. Political Behavior. 
ISSN 0190-9320 , http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9504-2
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/65531/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Political Behavior
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9504-2
1 
ORIGINAL PAPER
Being Heard above the Noise: The Role of Incumbent Issue 
Diversity in Election Campaigns
Zachary Greene1 
 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
Historical policy reputations inluence voters’ perceptions of parties’ electoral cam-
paigns. In the face of their recent experiences in oice, government parties’ thought-
fully crafted electoral messages likely compete for voters’ attention with a wealth of 
broader information about the government’s policy activities and priorities. For their 
message to be heard, incumbent parties must ofer a focused policy message that 
draws voters’ attention to the issues they most prioritize. Considering the issue scope 
of parties’ electoral messages, I hypothesize that incumbency status determines 
the efect issue appeals have on the votes parties receive. Opposition parties may 
proit from including more issues, but incumbent parties’ policy reputations limit 
the potential beneits from diverse appeals. Using evidence from 25 OECD coun-
tries over a 60 year period, I ind that parties’ incumbent status conditions the efect 
of issue diversity on parties’ aggregate electoral success. Voters reward incumbents 
for focusing their platforms, but reward opposition parties for diverse appeals. The 
results for incumbent parties are robust to extensive sensitivity analyses. The theory 
and evidence broadly suggest that incumbent parties with more focused policy mes-
sages can, at least partially, overcome the weight of their past policy reputations.
Keywords Issue competition · Political parties · Issue attention · Election 
campaigns · Issue scope
Media reports and scholars often indicate (at least implicitly) that the breadth of 
issues discussed in election campaigns hold consequences for parties’ electoral suc-
cess. Voters’ perceptions of campaigns likely difer when parties refer to a wide a 
variety of issues or more narrowly focus on a small number of topics. Yet, evidence 
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on the issue scope of campaigns and its electoral consequences remains unexplored. 
For example, it is unclear whether parties such as the French Parti Socialiste in 1993 
are punished for discussing so many issues (over 27) that speciic policy goals are 
diicult to discern. Or, do single issue parties only attract limited support because 
of the narrow scope of their messages? Perspectives deriving from Downs (1957), 
Schattschneider (1975), or Riker (1982) suggest an electoral dynamic between par-
ties’ past electoral success and the issues they discuss, yet few analyses consider 
how the breadth or scope of parties’ campaigns inluences their electoral success.
Building on the strengths of issue competition research, I outline a perspective 
on issue scope and competence. I propose that the relative number and salience of 
issues parties include in election campaigns, issue scope or issue diversity, condi-
tionally determines voter support.1 The efect of diverse issue appeals depends on 
parties’ government status. Including a broad range of issues allows parties to appeal 
to a wide coalition of supporters when they are in the opposition. Incumbent policy 
reputations and the broader information available about government parties’ priori-
ties, however, place constraints on the issues parties can use to mobilize voter sup-
port (Green and Jennings 2012a, b; Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012; Greene 2016a). 
The immediacy of recent policy activities to voters limits the efect of issue scope 
by diluting the extent to which the manifesto alone represents the party’s message. 
Parties campaigning on a smaller number of issues in this case can indicate a strong 
and explicit dedication to those issues, while more diverse appeals become lost. 
Limited issue scope comes with a potential downside; parties risk being perceived 
as uncompromising, irresponsible, or in the most extreme case, even single-issue if 
they ignore salient topics. Therefore, incumbent status determines the efect of issue 
scope on electoral success. Opposition parties attract more votes when campaign 
appeals are more diverse, whereas incumbents beneit when they limit their scope to 
a smaller diversity of issues.
To evaluate predictions on the efect of parties’ campaigns, I examine hypoth-
eses predicting that issue scope motivates voter behavior. I demonstrate support 
consistent with this perspective using data on issue diversity from the Compara-
tive Manifesto Project for 25 OECD countries from 1960 to 2012.2 In particular, 
the analysis reveals consistent evidence for the negative efect of issue diversity on 
incumbent parties’ vote shares. Extensive robustness checks including two-stage 
least squares, a range of governmental and party controls, varying measurement and 
modeling strategies, and even accounting for the medley of reasons driving parties’ 
1 In this paper, I use the terms issue scope and issue diversity interchangeably. Issue scope indicates 
whether a platform narrowly focuses on a small number of issues, such as stereotypes of single issue 
parties, or disperses across many issues. Broad political commentary often references concepts related 
to diversity to describe campaigns. For example, a candidate’s political message might be described as 
too narrow or the competition might force the candidate to go “of message.” Despite the proliferation of 
this commentary, few analyses assess whether a narrow or broad political campaign message wins votes. 
Stoll (2011), Boydstun et al. (2014), Greene (2016a), and Van Heck (2016) present prominent examples 
of political science research on issue diversity.
2 Replication materials can be found at the Political Behavior Dataverse. Greene (2018). Portions of this 
research were supposed by the C2 project of the SFB 884 “The Political Economy of Reforms” Research 
Centre funded by the German Research Council (DFG).
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issue competition strategies suggest that issue diversity’s efect remains even once 
accounting for issue diversity’s contextual causes. A series of sensitivity analyses 
using an alternate measure of issue diversity from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
and large number of alternate model speciications reveal consistent support for the 
efect of incumbent issue diversity.
This perspective holds implications for conceptions of election campaigns, gov-
ernment accountability, and broad democratic theory. The indings show that par-
ties’ ability to distract from their policy reputation by increasing the scope of issues 
may be more independent from their context than past studies suggest (e.g. Greene 
2016a, b). Incumbents may increase the diversity of their platforms in response to 
poor economic conditions, but the results show that a more focused policy platform 
nearly always beneits incumbents even accounting for the endogenous efects of 
the economy. An unfocused policy message limits the efectiveness of parties’ cam-
paigns and results in decreased voter support for incumbent parties. Furthermore, 
diverse appeals work diferently than those from a broad or vague appeal strategy 
(e.g. Somer-Topcu 2015), as the distinct groups parties seek to mobilize through 
their issue emphasis will be unable to project their positions onto the party if issue 
appeals fail to be heard or are perceived as insincere. Substantively, the scope of 
parties’ campaigns has a similar immediate impact on vote outcomes to other impor-
tant tactics. While voters may become informed using broad factors such as the 
economy, the main results and robustness checks indicate that election campaigns 
likely also matter.
A functioning representative democracy requires that governments react to con-
stituent demands and voters can in turn hold parties electorally accountable for being 
unresponsive. Groups supporting issues consistently excluded from campaigns will 
be less substantively represented than groups supporting topics more consistently 
addressed. Parties, particularly in oice, must then make a clear choice over which 
issues to address, as additional issues over their core message may fail to deliver. 
Conversely, governing parties minimize the incumbent’s curse through a clear, 
focused message that discusses a narrower range of topics.
Issue Salience and Competition
Research on parties’ campaigns focuses on strategic choices such as selective issue 
emphasis or relative preferences. These theories largely predict that parties empha-
size issues or shift positions to attract votes or undercut support for competitors. 
Theories of issue competition suggest a dynamic role between issue emphasis, elec-
toral conditions and voter support that has become increasingly important (Green-
Pedersen 2007), yet provide only limited consideration of the scope of parties’ 
messages.
Studies of issue competition ofer conceptual foundations to explain issue scope. 
Seminal work by scholars such as Schattschneider (1975) and Riker (1982) envi-
sioned political contests being waged over candidates’ issue emphasis. Conceptu-
ally, issues are topics below the level of broad ideological cleavages (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967), but over which groups in society disagree and can be mobilized 
 Political Behavior
1 3
(Budge 1993). Whereas Schattschneider hypothesizes that electoral loss leads par-
ties to mobilize on new issues (expanding the scope of debate), Riker’s perspective 
predicts that issues disappear from campaigns through a process of natural selection; 
less successful issues disappear from the public debate. Both perspectives empha-
size past elections as a source of information to evaluate the electoral viability of 
issues and the uncertainty of emphasizing new ones.
Contemporary perspectives also emphasize that parties may use past election 
results to inform their campaigns, but that their utility is limited across contexts. 
Following alternate decision-rules, parties may choose to ignore this informa-
tion, respond to electoral losses, or even emphasize issues that their competitors 
may struggle to address for ideological reasons (e.g. Budge 1994). Studies from 
a dynamic agent-based modeling perspective further add that “Hunter parties,” or 
those that repeat policy changes in response to positive support in the past, outper-
form others that do not seem to make extensive use of past electoral success (Laver 
2005). Yet, parties’ ability to respond to this information is likely constrained by 
parties’ internal factions and decision-making process (Budge et  al. 2010; Ceron 
2012; Schumacher et al. 2013; Greene and Haber 2016).
On both theoretical and empirical grounds scholars have examined the contexts 
in which parties discuss issues. Broadly, parties’ campaigns are designed to manage 
intra-party support and attract voters. Consequently, these perspectives emphasize 
the role of parties’ historical reputations, public opinion, and parties’ strategic posi-
tioning for the issues addressed within their campaigns.
Foremost, the issue ownership perspective develops an explanation of parties’ 
issue appeals from their historical behavior in oice and policy reputations (Petro-
cik 1996). Scholars have long shown that parties beneit from emphasizing issues 
important to historical supporters (Hibbs 1977; Budge and Farlie 1983). By dedi-
cating resources to an issue, parties develop a positive policy reputation (Petrocik 
1996). Consequently, parties beneit from addressing these issues when the public 
perceive them as most competent on those issues.
Empirical analysis indicates a complex relationship between parties’ reputations 
and their campaigns. In particular, issue ownership reputations primarily impact the 
voters that that hold an issue salient (Bélanger and Meguid 2008). Further, a party’s 
ownership of an issue is rarely complete (Bélanger and Gélineau 2010; Geys 2012). 
Voters’ perceptions of parties’ competencies themselves are inluenced by parti-
san identiication and ideological proximity (Vegetti 2014; see also Stubager and 
Slothuus 2013). Ultimately, voter perceptions of ownership provide a weak predictor 
for what parties do in oice (Egan 2013).
Other perspectives contend that parties respond to public opinion. They predict 
that parties address issues when they become salient to societal groups (Spoon and 
Klüver 2014; Klüver and Spoon 2016). The logic follows that as issues become 
prominent to the public, parties discuss them or appear unresponsive (Adams et al. 
2011). Exogenous events and economic conditions pressure governmental parties to 
develop diverse policies (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Greene 2016a). The 
underlying premise is that ignoring salient topics is risky. Disregarding important 
salient events likely causes parties to appear out of touch and unresponsive, which 
limits their ability to only focus on issues that voters’ perceive them as owning. 
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Therefore, when other parties in the system address diverse issues, disregard for 
important issues perceived to be important could cause parties to lose support or 
provide opportunities for opposition criticism (Sigelman and Buell 2004; Sulkin 
2005; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010).
In addition to their historical reputations, constituencies and public opinion, inter-
party competition and the electoral context more broadly drives issue appeals. Stud-
ies of the party system agenda indicate that incumbents generally respond to promi-
nent opposition critiques (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Likewise, 
new party challengers with distinct issue-focused campaigns can decrease support 
for older parties (Spoon 2011; Spoon et al. 2014). New parties’ electoral threat and 
mainstream parties’ ability to legitimize new party challengers that undercut their 
primary competitor parties can lead parties to address new issues (Meguid 2008). 
Furthermore, when parties hold electorally unfavorable or ideologically distant pref-
erences on the most important dimension of conlict they act as entrepreneurs by 
discussing new topics to attract electoral support (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt 
and De Vries 2015). Parties with greater internal diversity also increase the breadth 
of issues they address (Greene and O’Brien 2016). Although voters allow parties 
greater leeway to change positions on certain issues (Tavits 2007), evidence sug-
gests that emphasizing too many tangential topics may lead to electoral costs. The 
broader political context constrains parties’ ability to choose to address core or more 
tangential topics (Green 2011).
Broadly, theories of issue competition propose clear reasons why parties address 
new issues and the efect of these appeals on voter perceptions. Parties add issues 
as they become salient to the public or seek to mobilize new groups with previously 
undiscussed topics. These theories address the competing incentives parties encoun-
ter as they select and emphasize topics, yet make few predictions about how many 
appeals a party can concurrently make. Few analyses directly link these perspectives 
to broad empirical tests predicting voter behavior from issue scope. I extend this 
research to consider the electoral implications of issue scope.
The Consequences of Diverse Appeals
Parties discuss issues when they expect electoral rewards for emphasizing them. Par-
ties, therefore, should only emphasize their political strengths, assuming full infor-
mation about the issues that increase support. This logic implies that parties capable 
of campaigning on diverse topics will appeal to a greater range of issue-motivated 
voters. The extent to which parties beneit from emphasizing issues depends on vot-
ers’ priorities. Voters value the relative location of parties’ preferences on broad 
ideological dimensions (de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and De Vries 2015), but 
they also hold strong preferences and diferences in perceived salience. Issue owner-
ship theories argue that parties beneit from campaigning on topics voters perceive 
the party as competent on. From this perspective, parties likely address all topics 
that would provide them with even a marginal electoral gain.
Competence perceptions are less informed when parties have less relevant or cur-
rent policy reputations. Consequently, opposition parties are likely able to articulate 
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a more deliberate and crafted policy message, free from ongoing compromise and 
focused only on issues they identify as most important to traditional electoral con-
stituencies and voters more broadly (Stubager and Slothuus 2013). Relatively less 
unencumbered by recent policy reputations or the need to square campaign mes-
sages with ongoing policy-making, opposition parties should discuss issues on 
which they hold a relative advantage to build the largest coalition of supporters.3 
Due to past electoral losses, opposition parties will try to beneit from drawing 
attention away from the issues beneitting the government (Riker 1982) or on which 
they hold unpopular positions (de Vries and Hobolt 2012). Voters reward parties 
for discussing their most important issues, as they perceive these parties as respon-
sive, ideologically proximate, and competent on those issues (Bélanger and Meguid 
2008). Furthermore, parties addressing diverse issues are more likely to hit on those 
that resonate most with new voter coalitions (e.g. Riker 1982). Consequently, oppo-
sition parties discussing more issues would attract a greater range of voters. As 
Schattschneider’s (1975) boxing match intuits, parties addressing more topics mobi-
lize more diverse constituents. This logic suggests that parties capable of includ-
ing more issues for the preceding reasons will attract great electoral support.4 This 
logic informs the preliminary hypothesis in which parties have little recent policy 
reputation;
H1 Parties with greater issue diversity in their election platforms will attract a 
greater percentage of the vote.
The initial hypothesis focuses on the scope of issues for parties with only hypo-
thetical policy reputations. But, the efectiveness of parties’ strategies likely varies 
under alternate political arrangements. I argue that incumbency imposes the key 
constraint limiting the efectiveness of parties’ policy messages. From this perspec-
tive voters hold stronger perceptions of current government parties’ reputations than 
they do for opposition reputations (this perspective is consistent with Bawn and 
Somer-Topcu 2012; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013). Consequently, these percep-
tions limit the efectiveness of incumbents’ appeals to focus voter attention on their 
most preferred issues. This logic leads me to argue that unlike opposition parties, 
incumbents must focus their policy messages on a small number of issues for their 
messages to be heard over the noise from their electoral context. Voters’ perceptions 
4 This is not to argue that parties can address any issue they like and then increase electoral support, but 
that when parties selectively choose a more diverse set of issues, they will increase their support. Even 
accounting for the selective emphasis, there is probably a ceiling efect; models using a logged version of 
the primary independent variable in the Appendix reveal substantively similar results.
3 Long term reputations are also important, but incumbents have a more salient and obvious current 
policy reputation. Voters’ generally have greater information about government parties’ immediate pol-
icy priorities from media reports and even opposition critiques of their observed behaviour in govern-
ment. From a methodological standpoint, ixed efects for parties would likely account for most efects 
of a long-term reputation. Additional models (in Online Appendix) controlling for how long parties have 
spent in the government or opposition more directly measure long term reputations from their time in 
oice.
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of incumbents’ recent policy reputations and current political conditions create a 
noisy hurdle that incumbent messages struggle to overcome.
Foremost, parties’ campaigns relect electoral context. For example, incumbents 
divert attention from economic issues by campaigning on diverse topics when they 
expect to perform poorly (Vavreck 2009; Greene 2016a). Research on party organi-
zational change hypothesizes that electoral losses impact parties’ internal politics 
and strategy (Kitschelt 1989; Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Tan 2003). Par-
ties pursue alternate tactics, focusing on core or broad constituency appeals, depend-
ent on their position in oice (Ezrow et al. 2011; Green 2011). Incumbent parties 
often deviate from their primary messages by taking up issues important to competi-
tors to avoid future criticism (Sulkin 2005) and in response to their competitors or 
the broader party system agenda. This issue uptake results in incumbent parties dis-
cussing issues that overlap with their competitors or may even beneit their electoral 
competitors (e.g. Sigelman and Buell 2004; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). 
Public opinion (Ezrow 2007; Spoon 2011; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and 
Meyer 2014) and government status regularly inluence the topics parties campaign 
on (Sulkin 2005; De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Schumacher et al. 2013).
I add that incumbents face vastly diferent incentives in how they construct their 
policy messages and the structure of their campaigns than opposition parties. Con-
trolling oice comes with many policy and resource beneits, but also reputational 
and informational liabilities. Because they organize the structures of government 
and consequently bare policy-making responsibility for the state of the country, 
incumbents have salient and ongoing activities voters use to evaluate the content of 
their messages (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012). This complements research inding 
that voters use substantial information about incumbents’ policy activities such as 
the state of the economy that is not directly inluenced by parties’ policy messages. 
This efect is more unique to incumbent parties as voters use other sources of infor-
mation (like their perceptions of incumbent behavior) to evaluate opposition parties’ 
strengths (Green and Jennings 2012a, b). The disconnect between the content con-
tained in incumbent parties’ messages and voter perceptions of their campaigns and 
broader priorities is likely exacerbated as media reports often ofer limited coverage 
of the priorities included in candidates’ and parties’ policy messages (e.g. Branden-
burg 2006; Lühiste and Banducci 2016; Greene and Lühiste 2017; Merz 2017).
This logic implies that incumbency structures incentives diferently than for 
opposition parties; government parties have tangible, temporally relevant, policy 
records. Their ongoing policy activities and association with government means that 
voters regularly receive information about the party’s revealed priorities through 
their activities in government. Although incumbents are hypothetically free to set 
the content of their agendas, their policy reputations, electoral context, and even 
opposition critiques of their policy performance mean they must address a range of 
issues they would normally seek to avoid emphasizing or appear unresponsive (e.g. 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010).5 Incumbent candidates must account for their 
5 Based on a complementary logic, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) ind that incumbents respond 
to the issues salient to the party system agenda and opposition parties’ agendas, particularly when elec-
toral conditions are unfavourable for the government. From this perspective, incumbents often pick up 
issues that other parties hold long-term positive reputations on. This implies that by emphasizing these 
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strengths as well as the immediately relevant recent policies.6 In the opposition, par-
ties’ reputations are either hypothetical or based on longer term historical experi-
ences. To impact voter perceptions, government party strategies must account for 
these reputations. Incumbency induces policy reputations to take on a contemporary 
or recent importance with voters (see also Green and Jennings’ 2012a, b discussion 
of government versus opposition competence perceptions).
Even if incumbents ignore their records, voters likely form opinions on incum-
bent performance based on media and opposition messages (Walgrave et al. 2008; 
Walgrave et al. 2009). Indeed, reputations for competence across issues relate. The 
likelihood that voters perceive a party as competent on a range of topics increases 
when their competence on one issue increases (Green and Jennings 2012a, b). 
Assuming a party possesses a positive reputation for some issues, they might narrow 
their focus to only those issues.7 By emphasizing positive reputations on these select 
issues, parties can increase the likelihood that voters become aware of this priority 
and broadly foster perceptions of competence.
From this perspective, a focused policy message might mobilize voters’ cognitive 
bias to create a competence ‘halo.’8 For potentially supportive, but issue motivated 
voters, appeals targeted toward their most salient issues encourages the perception 
that the party is competent on a range of issues. A clear policy message then pro-
vides voters with a comparison point (similar to what Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012 
label as a discount) and limits the need to campaign on all issues. Consequently, vot-
ers likely place themselves closer to those parties than their actual positions warrant 
on less salient issues (Tomz and van Houweling 2009; Rovny 2012, 2013; Somer-
Topcu 2015). This discussion implies that voter evaluations of incumbents will be 
more positive when presented with a focused policy message on a small issue scope.
Altogether, this logic indicates that incumbent parties proit when they focus their 
attention on a limited set of issues for a number of reasons. When incumbent par-
ties’ election campaigns are forced to become too diverse they attract less support 
than incumbents with a clear, direct message because of the broader information and 
perceptions voters hold about incumbents. As voters focus more on revealed behav-
iors and discount parties’ messages, the contents of an overly diverse message likely 
become lost or fail to reach the intended audience. Essentially, the large amount of 
information about their policy behaviors and activities overpowers the incumbent 
Footnote 5 (continued)
issues, the incumbent de-emphasizes their owned issues and may even make the negative conditions 
more salient.
6 The 1993 French Parti Socialiste platform stated they “managed great reforms, but also sufered fail-
ures” (p. 1). The platform continued that the PS celebrated “10 Years of Reforms” under the guidance 
of President Mitterand, later discussing policy successes related to the economy, social cohesion, lib-
erty and equality, institutional reforms, and the European Parliament. The platform also addressed “dark 
points” explaining their failure to reduce high unemployment (p. 2) (Volkens et al. 2011).
7 Empirically, Greene (2016a) inds that parties often focus attention on quality of life issues such as 
Welfare and the Environment when their platform issue diversity is low.
8 In psychological terms, the halo efect explains that physical attractiveness leads respondents to rate 
candidates more positively on unrelated scales, such as intellect or height. Political scientists demonstrate 
similar bias in evaluations of candidate attractiveness to competence evaluations (Verhulst et al. 2010).
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party’s diverse, but weak appeals. Further, incumbents that distribute attention 
across too many issues (even if they are past achievements) risk being labeled as 
uninterested in any individual policy as the limited salience signals the party’s indif-
ference. Likewise, addressing issues owned by other parties’ also likely shifts vot-
ers to view opposition parties more favorably (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 
2010). Finally, an overly diverse message might encourage the perception that 
incumbents only opportunistically seek to maintain the status quo with no clear pol-
icy interests. Ultimately, an inability to reach distinct voter groups, an unclear or 
distracted message, and evidence of only a weak policy commitment are unlikely to 
motivate many issue focused voters to turnout.
Instead, a more cohesive, less diverse platform will indicate a clear and force-
ful policy message to overcome voters’ discounts of the incumbent and signals gov-
ernment competence more broadly. A narrow policy message allows incumbents 
to overcome past policy reputations by focusing directly on future reforms rather 
than a range of successes and failures (that might also remind voters of other par-
ties’ strengths). Proposed reforms will be clearer and their importance articulated 
to a wider audience. Ultimately, if voters discount government parties’ statements 
because of their policy records (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012), incumbents will 
need to develop a clearer, cohesive message to attract the most voter support. In the 
second hypothesis, I propose that incumbency status moderates the efect of issue 
diversity on electoral success.
H2 Incumbency moderates the efect of issue diversity. Greater issue diversity 
increases voter support for opposition parties, but decreases support for incumbent 
government parties.
In summary, the scope of issues in parties’ campaigns predicts party electoral 
success. Building on past studies of issue competition, I argue that as opposition 
parties increase issue scope they attract greater electoral support. The logic follows 
that their more abstract policy reputations and fewer competing narratives about 
their policy priorities allow these parties to create more purposeful election cam-
paigns. Incumbent parties, however, beneit from an alternate approach. Including 
a smaller number of issues enables them to overcome the noise generated by their 
broader policy reputations and information voters have about the governments’ pol-
icy priorities from the electoral context. Essentially, a more focused message allows 
incumbents to overcome voters’ discounts of their policy statements. Voters punish 
incumbents when they are weighed down by the details and compromises of their 
mundane policy records and incumbents fail to ‘stay on message.’
Data and Methods
I examine these hypotheses using aggregate level data on party competition. The 
primary analysis predicts the percentage of votes for parties using the ParlGov 
(Döring and Manow 2012) dataset. I focus this analysis on 25 OECD countries 
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in the post-war era.9 This results in 1854 observations that include 274 parties in 
327 elections. As the main test of the proposed efect of issue diversity on elec-
tion outcomes, I start with a broad test of the theory’s validity using the Compara-
tive Manifestos Project (CMP) (version 2015a). This design parallels a broad range 
of research on the efects of campaign strategies on election outcomes (e.g. Tavits 
2007; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow 2010; Adams 
et al. 2011; Schleiter and Tavits 2014).
The analysis requires a measure of issue scope in election campaigns. Like recent 
work on the efect of the economy and intra-party politics on election campaigns and 
studies of policy agendas (John and Jennings 2010; Jennings et al. 2011; Stoll 2011; 
Boydstun et al. 2014; Greene and O’Brien 2016; Greene 2016a; Van Heck 2016), I 
measure the concentration and number of issues in parties’ platforms using a func-
tion of issue diversity, an increasingly important topic in numerous areas of political 
research.10 Diversity indices are constructed as a function of entropy or fractionali-
zation. Using the CMP (Volkens et al. 2011), I create a measure of issue diversity 
labeled the Efective Number of Manifesto Issues (ENMI) based on a transformation 
of Shannon’s H (Greene 2016a). Following Greene (2016a), I combine the naturally 
opposing pairs in the CMP to create issue level categories. The resulting 42 catego-
ries make up the base issues used to construct the ENMI.11 Alternate approaches 
to constructing ENMI using the Herindahl Index, limiting the index to only eco-
nomic policies, or collapsing all economic issues into a single category leads to 
substantively similar results. Like previous indices of issue diversity,12 this measure 
includes information about the number of total issues discussed in the manifesto and 
the relative emphasis each party receives. I present summary statistics in Table 1.13
At face value, the ENMI measure seems captures a number of important dynam-
ics going on within and across parties. Foremost, estimates of ENMI summarize 
the parties’ issue scope. For example, Fig. 1 illustrates the values of ENMI for the 
major parties in the United Kingdom. Generally, both parties had higher ENMI in 
the 1980s, although the parties’ platforms seem to change frequently between elec-
tions. ENMI drops again in the early 2000s. In both cases, it seems that important 
changes to party leadership led to fairly large shifts in ENMI such as Blair’s selec-
tion as Labour leader in 1997 or Cameron’s rise to leadership for the Conservatives 
9 See the Appendix for sample countries and years.
10 See Boydstun et al. (2014) for a discussion of diversity’s importance.
11 I also remove all text that cannot be coded so that the indicator refers to the diversity of policy state-
ments irrespective of non-policy goals.
12 Similar measures have been used in research on political communication and policy agendas (Jen-
nings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014). For greater discussion on the construction and validation of the 
ENMI measure, see Greene (2016a).
13 There is little theoretical expectation that parties’ left–right positions closely relate to their ENMI. 
Descriptively, I ind that ENMI weakly correlates (− 0.1743) with the CMP’s left–right scale (RILE). 
Increased ENMI is associated with more leftward positions. Opposition party ENMI are much more 
closely associated with their position (− 0.2266) than incumbents (0.0399), although neither corre-
lation is particularly strong. Intriguingly, there appears to be a stronger non-linear relationship. More 
extreme positions associate with less diverse (lower ENMI) platforms (RILE squared has a correlation of 
− 0.372).
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in 2005. On average, parties in the sample include 16.6 issues in their platforms. 
ENMI ranges from 1.7 (the ultra-Orthodox religious Israeli Shahs party in 1999) 
to 31.5 (the Gaullist party in 1962). These indicators match perceptions of these 
parties’ campaigns. In particular, Hazan and Diskin (2000) note that Shas ran “an 
anti-law-and-order theme” in response to the recent arrest of their leader (p. 632). 
Linking most issues to the broader international context, the extremely diverse 1962 
Gaullist manifesto, on the other hand, included brief discussion on a range of issues 
such as the recent constitutional reforms in France, the then inished war in Algeria, 
broader European politics and economics, and even the Soviet Union. More gen-
erally, ENMI increases over the course of the sample for the majority of parties, 
Table 1  Summary statistics
Summary statistics present the mean value for continuous variables and the percentage equalling 1 for all 
indicator variables
Mean SD Minimum Maximum N
Percentage vote 16.383 14.3 0 69.7 1854
ENMI 16.684 5.87 1 31.5 1854
Moderated position (0,1) 0.559 0.497 0 1 1854
GDP growth rate 2.856 2.77 − 6.81 13.6 1854
Incumbent cabinet 0.300 0.459 0 1 1854
Majoritarian election (0,1) 0.166 0.372 0 1 1854
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perhaps relecting the increased competition on new issues and dimensions such as 
the environment or immigration (Meguid 2008). Mainstream parties tend to have 
more issues than smaller, niche parties such as green and radical right parties.
To test the second hypothesis, I include an interaction of ENMI with the party’s 
government status. I use an indicator variable equal to one when the party is in the 
last, non-caretaker government prior to the election as measured by ParlGov (Döring 
and Manow 2012). I expect that the efect of ENMI will be positive for opposition 
parties and negative for incumbents.
In the main analysis, I include control variables to account for parties’ electoral 
strategies. In particular, I create a dummy variable labelled Moderated Position to 
account for relative shifts in parties’ positions using the logged RILE scale from the 
CMP (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009; Lowe et al. 2011). The 
dummy variable equals one when the party shifted its position closer to the mean 
position of all parties in an election. This variable is interacted with the incumbency 
variable to account for diferent strategies for incumbent and opposition parties (e.g. 
Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012).14
In addition to parties’ strategic maneuvering, I also account for economic voting 
arguments by including the GDP growth rate from the OECD and its interaction 
with government incumbency (Lewis-Beck 2006). I multiply the incumbency vari-
able with economic growth to distinguish the efects of the economy for incumbent 
and opposition parties. Furthermore, I use a dummy variable to distinguish majori-
tarian electoral systems (Somer-Topcu 2009).15
To test the primary hypotheses, I present ixed efects models with a lagged 
dependent variable in the main analysis to account for heterogeneity caused by the 
inclusion of the same parties in multiple elections. Furthermore, past studies of 
issue diversity and issue salience indicate there is a complex relationship between 
economic conditions, incumbency and issue diversity (Vavreck 2009; Hellwig 2012; 
Greene 2016a; Williams et al. 2016). To account for these arguments, I perform an 
additional two stage least squares analyses treating ENMI as endogenous to the elec-
toral environment (see Online Appendix).
Analysis
In this section, I describe the results from a ixed efects model predicting the per-
centage vote for parties accounting for the party and number of elections that the 
party competed in. In Table 2, I present an analysis of the full sample as well as sub-
sample analyses for incumbent and opposition parties to reduce the chance that neg-
ative correlations drive the results. The results from the analysis provide evidence 
14 Models using a continuous measure of parties’ left–right positions lead to substantively similar 
results.
15 Mixed efects models (see Online Appendix) that allow for additional controls such as niche party 
status, the efective number of parties, federalism, a directly elected president, prime minister’s party, 
cabinet party, and coalition governance lead to similar results.
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consistent with a story in which incumbent ENMI inluences’ the party’s electoral 
success.
The irst hypothesis (H1) predicts that parties with higher ENMI attract broader 
electoral support. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coeicients for ENMI in the 
opposition party sample (Model 1) and the full sample (Model 3) in Table  2 are 
positive. However, the coeicients fail to reach standard levels of statistical sig-
niicance. Although the coeicients are often in the correct direction, the efect of 
ENMI for opposition parties is inconsistent across both the primary and secondary 
analyses and should therefore be interpreted as inconsistent with H1.
However, the second hypothesis predicts a more complicated relationship. In 
particular, I hypothesize that incumbent ENMI has the inverse efect of opposition 
Table 2  Fixed efects OLS with ENMI from the CMP
The dependent variable is percentage vote for the party. Models include ixed efects to account for coun-
try and election levels. Standard errors are robust. ENMI is constructed using Shannon’s H from the 
CMP
Signiicance tests are two-tailed: +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
(1) (2) (3)
Opposition Incumbents Full
ENMI 0.037 0.032
(0.032) (0.032)
Incumbent × ENMI − 0.089* − 0.089*
(0.040) (0.039)
Moderated position 0.316 0.393
(0.245) (0.252)
Incumbent × moderated position − 0.358 − 0.507
(0.442) (0.475)
GDP growth rate 0.042 0.162* 0.048
(0.041) (0.077) (0.042)
Incumbent × GDP growth rate 0.079
(0.086)
Incumbent − 0.399
(0.788)
Majoritarian election 2.579* − 0.381 1.105+
(1.025) (0.810) (0.594)
%  Votet−1 0.639*** 0.547*** 0.621***
(0.044) (0.064) (0.032)
Constant 3.858*** 10.895*** 5.619***
(0.861) (1.829) (0.835)
AIC 6714.623 3121.950 10,057.051
BIC 6740.462 3143.563 10,106.777
Root mean squared error 3.216 3.975 3.637
Log-likelihood − 3352.312 − 1555.975 − 5019.525
Observations 1297 557 1854
 Political Behavior
1 3
parties’ ENMI. The subsample analysis for incumbent parties (Model 2) and the 
interaction of incumbency status with ENMI tests this hypothesis (H2) in Model 
3. The negative and statistically signiicant coeicients for incumbent ENMI show 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis in both models. Government parties with 
higher ENMI attract a smaller percentage of the vote than government parties with 
fewer issues based on these results.16
I present the predicted efect of ENMI on the percentage votes that parties receive 
for opposition and government parties in Fig. 2 (from Model 3). Although it appears 
that as opposition parties discuss more issues they attract greater electoral support, 
the efect is not statistically signiicant from zero. The efect reverses for incumbent 
government parties, as predicted in the second hypothesis (H2) and is statistically 
diferent from zero at the 0.1 level and jointly diferent from the independent efect 
of ENMI at the 0.05 level.17 An increase of one standard deviation (5.9) in ENMI 
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Fig. 2  Predicted efect of ENMI on % vote for opposition and incumbent parties (95% Conidence inter-
vals are constructed from 1000 draws of the variance–covariance matrix based on Table 2, Model 3. The 
grey dashes at the bottom show the distribution of ENMI for incumbent and opposition parties)
16 Intriguingly, additional analysis in search of a threshold or “sweet spot” for incumbent ENMI (see 
Online Appendix) reveals that the beneit of having a lower ENMI is clearest for parties with ENMI less 
than approximately 26. Yet, the results are not wholly driven by these high values as models focused on 
incumbent parties excluding values of ENMI under 10 or over 25 reveal substantively similar results.
17 A Wald test of joint signiicance F-test indicates the joint efect of the interaction of incumbency and 
ENMI in Model 3 is statistically diferent from the efect of opposition ENMI at the 0.05 level and dif-
ferent from zero at the 0.1 level. Taller tick marks at the bottom of Fig. 2 illustrate the distribution for 
incumbent ENMI; lighter, shorter marks signify the distribution of opposition ENMI.
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decreases government parties’ votes by 0.66%. As a comparison to other research 
focused on parties’ electoral strategies (e.g. Downs 1957; Adams and Somer-Topcu 
2009), the magnitude of this efect is slightly larger than the efect of parties mod-
erating their platforms based on Model 3.18 Opposition parties that moderate their 
platforms have 0.4% higher votes, while incumbent parties decrease their vote by 
approximately 0.51%.19
Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analysis
The primary results evidence a consistent relationship between issue diversity and 
electoral support. Yet, critical scholars may argue that these results are driven by the 
operationalization of the independent variable, model speciication, case selection, 
or alternative processes. Therefore, I present results of extensive robustness checks 
in Online Appendix accounting for difering logics that show evidence largely con-
sistent with the main results. These models account for a range of model speciica-
tions to explore the results’ validity.
In particular, I use a measure of issue diversity, ENMI, derived using Shannon’s 
H to measure issue entropy using the CMP. This measure incorporates information 
about small categories that a measure of diversity from the Herindahl index would 
devalue. Results from this approach are robust to the operationalization of issue 
diversity using an alternate index. Likewise, I construct measures of ENMI from 
the CMP that include only the economy categories and treat all economic categories 
as a single issue. Analyses including these operationalizations lead to substantively 
similar results. Transforming ENMI using the natural log (+ 0.5) conirms the efect 
of incumbent ENMI as well.
Alternatively, scholars have noted numerous challenges that arise from the CMP’s 
coding scheme. To ensure that the results are not driven by solely by coding choices 
made by the CMP, I create a measure derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Sur-
veys (CHES; Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2015). 
The availability of expert survey data massively reduces the sample size and comes 
with alternate assumptions about the resulting measures of issue priorities. For 
example, experts likely use cues such as parties’ position in government to evaluate 
their issue attention (Adams et al. 2014; Lindstädt et al. 2015). Yet, the results using 
the CHES support the second hypothesis (the sub-sample for incumbents does not 
reach standard levels of signiicance, however, when controls are included. Although 
both measures lead to supportive results, the actual measures only weakly correlate 
(Pearson Coeicient 0.079).
18 The control variables in Model 3 perform mostly as expected. Opposition parties moderating their 
preferences attract more support, whereas government parties attract less support when they moderate, as 
Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012) might have predicted. See Online Appendix for alternate model specii-
cations.
19 The magnitude for the efect of moderating is similar to the one reported by Adams and Somer-Topcu 
(2009). Models using the continuous logged measure of rile from Lowe et al. (2011) lead to nearly iden-
tical results for the primary independent variables.
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Other modeling choices such as the exact time series speciication, the assump-
tion of a normally distributed dependent variable or the use of ixed efects may 
also lead to alternate results. However, I ind that models accounting more exten-
sively for the time series nature of the data (McDonald and Best 2006), the trun-
cated dependent variable (0 and 100), and models including a range of controls with 
varying intercepts reveal additional evidence consistent with the second hypothesis. 
Consistent with both hypotheses, Error Correction and Equilibrium Response Mod-
els both ind a short and long term negative efect of incumbent ENMI as well as 
a positive short and long term efect for the opposition’s ENMI. Estimates from a 
Tobit model with random efects that accounts for the truncation of observations 
with low vote totals also provides similar evidence for the theory.
Although the inclusion of ixed efects for country and election levels in the main 
analysis account for a number of alternative sources of heterogeneity, they also 
limit the ability to include measures that difer only at the country or electoral level. 
Instead a mixed efects model with varying intercepts at the country level enables 
the analysis to include these controls. In particular, I ind that mixed efects models 
that allow for additional controls such as niche party status, the efective number of 
parties, federalism, a directly elected president, prime minister’s party, cabinet party, 
and coalition governance lead to similar results.
Furthermore, alternate explanations of incumbent parties’ electoral success 
such as the cost of ruling (e.g. Fortunato and Adams 2015; Wlezien 2017) or the 
party system agenda (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010) may question the 
strength of the main results. However, controls for coalition participation, the prime 
minister’s party, the efective number of parties, the number of coalition parties, if 
the party has never been in government before (van Heck 2016), time in oice, the 
opposition’s ENMI and the party system ENMI, and even the years in the oppo-
sition or government show a robust efect of incumbent diversity (H2) in the full 
models. Other controls accounting for the electoral context by including measures 
of electoral volatility to account for voters’ willingness to change parties (e.g. their 
“availability”, Bartolini 1999), real levels of immigration, or unemployment yield 
results comparable to those presented in the main analysis. These results imply that 
the efect of incumbent ENMI is not solely driven by the costs of ruling, the elec-
toral context, or the party system agenda.
Furthermore, the theory may be driven by the diferences between small and 
larger parties if size also correlates with ENMI. However, the results suggest this is 
not the case. Excluding parties that did not receive at least one, ive or ten percent 
of the vote in the previous election (similar to Somer-Topcu 2015) shows consistent 
evidence for the second hypothesis.
Finally, the results may be driven by endogenous processes that drive both the 
party system agenda and opposition criticisms such as the economy (e.g. Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Results from a Two Stage Least Squares Model 
accounting for the potential of endogeneity to the economic context alone lead to 
substantively similar conclusions. Two Stage Models that also include measures of 
the largest opposition party’s ENMI, the party system agenda, and the incumbent’s 
overlap with the party system agenda illustrate a consistent efect for incumbent 
ENMI. Likewise, ixed efects models that include interactions of GDP growth with 
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ENMI and incumbency lead to similar results. In the full sample, Wald tests show 
that the coeicients for ENMI, its interaction with incumbency and GDP growth 
and the four-way interaction with the GDP growth just barely fail to reach statistical 
signiicance at standard levels, although the efect for incumbents is statistically dif-
ferent from the efect for opposition parties. None of the coeicients for interactions 
including GDP growth and ENMI are statistically signiicant. Like the 2SLS results, 
the efect of ENMI is independent from economic conditions and the broader party 
system agenda.
Altogether, the main results illustrate consistent support for the incumbent 
hypothesis. These additional models further demonstrate a robust efect of incum-
bent issue diversity from a range of modeling choices. Incumbent ENMI has a 
robust negative correlation with the votes these parties receive.
Conclusions
Scholars have long theorized that issues play important roles during parties’ election 
campaigns and impact parties’ behavior in government. However, they have yet to 
evaluate whether the scope of parties’ election campaigns matters. Do voters punish 
or reward parties for discussing a broad range of topics? The results from this analy-
sis provide a clear answer to this question using data from elections in 25 OECD 
countries over ive decades.20 The results show strong support for the hypothesis 
that voters punish incumbents for overly disperse campaign messages, although 
there is little evidence for opposition parties’ issue scope. This result holds under 
a wide range of modeling choices. As the French Parti Socialiste found in the early 
1990s, an overly disperse message can lead to electoral failure.
These indings provide support for a theory of issue competition that comple-
ments Schattschneider’s scope of competition or Riker’s natural selection approach. 
Electoral losers beneit from reaching out to broader groups, but government par-
ties struggle with their realized policy reputations. Economic conditions and gov-
ernment participation may shape parties’ strategies (Vavreck 2009; Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen 2010; Hellwig 2012; Greene 2016a; Williams et al. 2016), yet these 
results suggest that an independent efect of parties’ messages remains. Further evi-
dence is necessary to determine the extent to which additional aspects of the elec-
toral context such as the media or longer term policy reputations condition voters’ 
perceptions on the scope of parties’ messages.
The evidence in this paper indicates that issue diversity should be taken seriously 
as an important characteristic of election campaigns. Popular media discourse often 
discusses campaigns as if they are too dominated by a single issue or if they are 
too disperse. Issue diversity likely matters for a range of political outcomes (e.g. 
Jennings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014; Greene 2016b). Incorporating research 
on issue diversity provides a means of characterizing political campaigns that may 
20 Individual level evidence from nine CSES countries shows support for the causal mechanism; issue 
scope inluences perceptions of parties’ competencies (Greene 2017).
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result in new approaches to the study of elections. Indeed, if parties’ time in oice 
determines the diversity of their platforms, it is not only the increasing distance 
from the median voter or coalition position that impose the well-established costs 
of ruling (e.g. Fortunato and Adams 2015; Wlezien 2017), but also the clarity and 
diversity of the message itself.
Additional consideration of issue scope will beneit broad theories of democracy. 
The quality of democratic competition and citizens’ satisfaction with democracy 
(e.g. Reher 2015, 2016) likely depends on the extent to which parties campaign on 
more or less diverse platforms. If all parties campaign on too few issues, voters’ 
ability to select between platforms ofering competing solutions might disappear 
(e.g. Sigelman and Buell 2004). Contexts where parties distribute their attention too 
widely could suggest that parties provide only limited attention to the most impor-
tant issues. In this case, deciding which party best represents a citizen’s priorities 
would be diicult. The scope of parties’ campaigns, therefore, might provide an 
approach to consider the breadth and focus of representation in modern democracies.
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